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Abstract Charles Griswold’s seminal work, Forgiveness, is the focus of the present
essay. Following Griswold, I distinguish the relevant virtue of character from something
that is more like an act or process. The paper discusses a number of hesitations I have
about Griswold’s analysis, at the level both of detail and of underlying conception.
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Forgiveness is no simple matter either to execute or to understand. Charles Griswold
explores forgiveness both in its guise as a virtue—I’ll call it “forgivingness”—and as
something that’s more difficult to categorize, something like an act or process. Griswold’s
Forgiveness provides a classical philosophical analysis of the act or process, “a theory of
paradigmatic forgiveness—of what forgiveness would have to be in order to be perfectly
accomplished.” Griswold’s is a fine book, one that serves as at once an able introduction
to and an accomplished advanced treatment of a set of difficult and important questions.
One of Wittgenstein’s legacies, one emphasized by Kripke, is an approach to
philosophic criticism that attends both to the details of views under discussion as
well as, perhaps even more significantly, the underlying conception, what Kripke
refers to as the picture of the domain. I will initially focus on a number of my
hesitations concerning Griswold’s analysis of forgiveness, the act or process, his
concern in the central portions of his book. I will raise matters of detail that at the
same time signal the need for a very different underlying conception. Afterward, I
turn to the virtue, some of whose features make this need even more dramatic.
Hesitation: Moral Anger and Resentment
Griswold, along with much of the literature, sees forgiveness as to some large extent a
matter of overcoming the offended party’s “moral anger,” “moral hatred” and like
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the use of the term, “moral,” according to which morality is not implicated; modern
philosophers speak of the moral sciences, where “moral” means something like
“concerning human nature” or “concerning human mores.” Griswold’s use of “moral
anger,” “moral hatred,” and the like seem, however, part of a conception of the domain
which sees it as highly moralized, beginning with a unjustified moral intrusion.
Forgiveness, on Griswold’s view, pivots on the offended party’s moral reckoning.
Are the offences for which apology and forgiveness are appropriate always,
typically, or paradigmatically moral offences? Are all significant breaches in human
relations moral breaches? Arguably even offensive personal affronts are not always
moral wrongs. Examples are plentiful: breaches of courtesy, speech that is too harsh,
various kinds of presumption, a pattern of behavior that while disturbing is too
close to the line to be remarked on but that persists over time. Or consider the
distribution of goods and attention within a family, where without ill will someone is
hurt, perhaps lastingly. Self-absorbed, someone fails to attend adequately to
another’s pain or joy. It’s difficult to see all such examples as involving moral
wrongs. Clearly the question of delimiting the scope of morality is beyond my reach
here. But Griswold’s locating forgiveness in strictly moral terrain is, I think, very
significant, and I’ll return to it below.1
Griswold sees “moral anger” as a justified consequence of personal offence; he
speaks similarly of “resentment.” It is not altogether clear from the text whether these are
precisely the same concepts. But clearly they are close, and perhaps the same. The idea
seems to be that there is in the well functioning moral agent’s response to offense
something relatively uniform, in Bishop Butler’s terms “a species of moral hatred…, a
retributive passion that instinctively seeks to exact a due measure of punishment.” (P. 39)
Why suppose any such uniformity? Our reactions to offence—moral, personal, or
however one thinks of them—vary widely and along myriad dimensions: with
personalities, contexts, social stratification, expectations, and the like. Anger is only
one amongst many reactions. A sample of others are revulsion, sadness, depression
with the state of things, annoyance, even relative indifference. And why presume
that the desire for revenge is ubiquitous? Such an urge is no doubt a deep and
primitive feature of human responsiveness to injury. But a deep feature is not
necessarily a universal feature.
I mentioned indifference as one possible response. It is not a response that Griswold
and others in this literature afford much respect. Griswold speaks as if such a reaction
bespeaks most likely a lack of self-respect, or else, much less likely, a kind of
sainthood. Sainthood aside, there are those no doubt who fail to react to offense (or
who over-react) out of a lack of self-regard. However, many people at least some of the
time refuse to take others’ untoward behavior to heart and there is no simple story to be
told about why. Indeed, sometimes it may be a function of psychological health and
perspective. If one proceeds through the world with a well-developed sense of irony,
perhaps grounded in a strong sense of self, all sorts of things become possible.
1 There is a large question concerning the scope of the moral, perhaps independent of what I am raising
here, but at least reminiscent of it. Bernard Williams and Harry Frankfurt, perhaps inspired by Nietzsche,
distinguish the moral from the ethical, a much broader domain that includes our values, loves, and the like.
Forgiveness may provide an interesting terrain to contrast such an approach like Griswold’s that sees the
category of the moral as overriding.
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And when there is anger, even at an uncontroversially moral offense, is one’s
reaction moral anger? What is moral anger? Is it a species of anger, one with a
different phenomenology than other sorts, or rather one with different sorts of
accompanying thoughts, or a merely different etiology? Assuming for a moment
that there is some distinctively moral anger, it must be very difficult to tease it
apart from a more personal anger. Such clarity would seem to be the last thing on
the mind of typical victims. And need one add “moral” to the other reactions
mentioned: moral depression, sadness, and the rest? What would be the point of
such an addition? What work does “moral” do in talk of moral anger, hatred, and
the like?
Griswold’s Analysis of Forgiveness: the Offender
I turn to the heart of Griswold’s analysis. Griswold formulates six conditions that
must be satisfied by the offender, in paradigmatic cases of forgiveness.2
1. There are two parts to this first condition: the offender must first
acknowledge that she was the responsible agent. And second, she must
demonstrate that she no longer wishes “to stand by herself as the author of
those wrongs.”
2. She must repudiate her deeds and disavow that she would author those deeds
again. This, Griswold explains, is a step toward showing that one is not simply
the “same person” who did the wrong. One thus, in Griswold’s words,
“repudiates the self that did X.”
3. The wrong-doer must both experience and express regret—not simply
acknowledge the wrongness of the act—and the regret must be expressed to
the wronged party.
4. The offender must commit to becoming the sort of person who does not inflict
injury, and that commitment must be shown through deeds as well as words.
(“Then,” comments Griswold, “her repudiation of her ‘past self’ would become
credible, and it is her task to make it so, for the ‘burden of proof’ is hers and
hers alone to shift.”)
These first four steps constitute a “contrition” condition. There are two additional
conditions:
5. The offender must show that she understands, from the injured person’s
perspective, the damage done by the injury.
6. The offender needs to offer a narrative account of “how she came to do
wrong, how that wrong-doing does not express the totality of her person, and
how she is becoming worthy of approbation. She needs to make herself
intelligible by offering up an account that is neither fiction nor excuse
making, and that puts the wrong-doing as well as the self that did the wrong
in context.”
2 Paraphrases and quotations are from pp. 49–51 of Forgiveness.
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Hesitation: What Did I Do???
When I first studied these conditions I, one who regularly asks for forgiveness, felt
as if I was losing touch with the project. Repudiation of the self? A full narrative that
reveals that my offense does not represent the “totality” of my person? On the
countless occasions I apologize, were I to issue any such full narrative or self
repudiation, I would likely be looked at quizzically and be told to lighten up.
I will turn in a moment to Griswold’s conception of these conditions as necessary
only with respect to paradigm cases; this might be seen as blunting my concern
about the conditions being overly extreme and dramatic. But I do want to register the
sense that some of these conditions have purchase only with respect to severe, even
heinous offenses. This threatens to skew any general account of forgiveness. Even if
what is at issue are paradigm cases, it’s not clear why the focus should be the most
heinous offenses.
It took me some time to see what Griswold was after in his talk of paradigms,
since I took the term to refer to classical or typical cases. One learns the meaning of
terms, one might suppose in the spirit of Wittgenstein or psychologist Eleanor
Rosch, by acquaintance with paradigms, typical cases, rather than by the intellectual
mastery of definitions. And if one uses paradigm in this Wittgensteinian way,
Griswold’s talk of paradigms and the analysis he proposes for them is indeed very
difficult to assimilate.
Attention to the beginning of Chapter 3, however, revealed that I had missed
Griswold’s intention. Griswold’s “paradigm” talk derives not from Wittgenstein but
from Plato: paradigm as perfect exemplar. Griswold’s view is that the sort of extreme
cases of moral breach that he emphasizes and the forgiveness that is appropriate to
them constitute a sort of perfect example of the phenomena in which he is interested.
Still, the connection between extreme cases and perfect ones remains obscure to
me. In what way are the extreme cases perfect examples? And why assume that the
human resolution of heinous moral offenses somehow models for us the resolution
of everyday hurts and indignities? In what way are the ordinary examples reflections
of the extreme ones. My own contrary, Wittgensteinian instinct is to make a study of
our actual practices of forgiveness focal. Wittgenstein’s advice was that we “look;
don’t think,” that we scrutinize actual practice rather than theorize about what it must
be like by our theoretical lights.
I vacillate between two ways to thinking about Griswold’s contribution here. At
moments, it seems to me that he has provided an analysis not of forgiveness in
general but rather of what it comes to in cases of heinous offenses. My dominant
tendency, though, is to suppose that even in such cases, forgiveness is not captured
by Griswold’s net.3 Perhaps Griswold’s discussion does illuminate the domain, but
in an unexpected way. Griswold’s conditions have natural application not so much to
forgiveness as to reconciling, reconstructing a relationship that has been damaged or
broken by a quite serious, even grievous, moral wrongs.
3 This reflects my reaction in the next sections to Griswold’s requirements on the side of the offended
party.
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Griswold’s Analysis: the Side of the Offended Party
There are three preliminary conditions on the side of the forgiver: the forswearing of
revenge, the moderation of resentment, and a commitment to letting go of all
resentment. The idea is that unless one has put aside revenge, the process is not well
underway. When one has gotten past the vindictive urge, and has begun to moderate
one’s anger, forgiveness is in process.
The completion of the process, complete forgiveness, has two requirements on the
side of the offended party. First, the resentment must be no more. And second, the
offended party must reaccept the person. Griswold sometimes describes this as a
change in belief: the offended party no longer thinks that the offender is a bad person
with whom one should not consort.
There is an important proviso on the first of these conditions: it not sufficient that
the resentment is gone, even gone for good. Instead the passing of resentment must
occur for moral reasons, because it’s the right thing to do. Once the offender has
fulfilled the conditions specified above, the victim’s resentment, says Griswold, is no
longer morally warranted. A consequence is that the offended party is “morally
obligated to forswear resentment.”
Hesitations: the Two Requirements
Griswold’s “change of belief” requirement This seems to have application only to
the most heinous offenses. Except for very serious offenses, such an initial harsh
judgment by the offended person—this is a bad person with whom I should not
consort—would bespeak an inappropriate judgmental character on the part of the
injured party. Nor is it not easy to construe this condition as suggestion something
weaker but analogous for more pedestrian offenses. The condition thus raises the
issues I raised above about conditions that apply only to extreme cases.
Griswold’s forswearing resentment idea This presents a new problem and from a
different direction. To suggest that forgiveness is not complete until resentment is
eradicated, virtually obliterated, seems too idealized to have purchase in actual
cases, even those that involve heinous offense. But if the condition is unrealistic
even for the extreme cases, this militates against the equation of extreme with
perfect cases, Platonic paradigms.
To begin with the cases of heinous offense, total eradication of resentment is
virtually impossible for most people, and perhaps not desirable. Only a saint would
be capable of a total elimination of her resentment towards those who, for example,
performed a genocide that included her loved ones. And in ordinary cases of
personal, forgivable offense, forgiveness involves “getting past” one’s resentment.
But this usefully imprecise expression hardly suggests that under no conditions
might any resentment arise again.
I apologize, you forgive me, and our relationship no longer bears the burden of
that offense. I am forgiven. But if I do it again, the former offense may re-emerge
in your thinking with renewed resentment. Alternatively, you may have forgiven
me, but on the occasion of a book you are reading, or a movie you are watching,
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or another incident with another person, or on many other sorts of occasion, the
old offense may come to mind and there may well be the taste of resentment. In
some such cases it will be natural to say that the forgiveness had its limitations,
that it was not complete. But certainly not in all cases. A certain amount of
lingering, hardly noticed, resentment is natural, unremarkable, and compatible with
having forgiven.
Hesitation: the Moral Environment of Forgiveness
I called attention earlier to Griswold’s emphasis on moral anger. In fact Griswold’s
picture of the entire domain is a highly moralized one. A potential forgiveness
situation paradigmatically begins with an unjustified moral intrusion. This typically
results in a justified moral anger on the part of the offended. But the justification
comes to an end when the offender fulfills the conditions specified, 1–6 above.
These conditions both involve the moral repair of the offender, and the reaching out
to the injured party to repair the moral damage. She asks the offended for
forgiveness. And the offended, if he is to do his moral duty, must grant the
forgiveness that only he, with his unique moral standing, is in a position to grant.4
That is, he must forswear resentment; he must “swear it off” as we might say, since it
is no longer morally justified. If, as is often the case, that resentment lingers—if his
duty cannot be accomplished at once—then the forgiveness is not complete. When
resentment is finally forsworn, we have forgiveness, full, complete, perfect.
As noted, Griswold requires not only that the resentment be permanently
eliminated, but that this happen for moral reasons, namely the offended party
recognizes that her resentment is no longer warranted. This seems to me to make
forgiveness too much a matter of moral calculation and reflection. When you
apologize to me in a heartfelt way, I am moved to forgive, resentment recedes, etc.
Perhaps I am touched by your reaching out. The wound is healed. In other cases
perhaps there was no deep wound; no real resentment to speak of. Your sincere
apology is all that I need to put what happened behind us. In many such cases, I
forgive, but not because I am motivated to do so by moral thinking or calculation.
That would be the proverbial one thought too many. Instead, my resentment lifts; I
no longer resent, period.
Contrast this with a case in which the wound is unhealed. Perhaps you have done
your part to apologize in a heartfelt manner but the offense is one to which I’m
particularly sensitive. At a certain point, I make a conscious, deliberate effort to
overcome my resentment. I do so—it takes a special exercise of the will and of
conscience—because it is the right thing to do. The latter situation is also part of
human experience. But it is hardly the norm. Why make it so?
Indeed there are examples that take us far from Griswold’s model of these things.
Perhaps you have injured me; perhaps it really stings. But perhaps I know you, and
care about you; I know your history, and the some of the difficulties you faced
4 Griswold writes that the moral community has ceded exclusive standing to the offended party to grant
forgiveness.
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earlier in your life, perhaps as a child, perhaps in a first marriage. I am ready to
forgive without an explicit apology. Perhaps we look in each other’s eyes and that’s
more than enough. Or perhaps I do not even need that much in order to let the
resentment go. I am hardly here forswearing resentment because it is no longer
warranted. Perhaps resentment is indeed still, technically speaking, warranted; surely
another who did not approach the situation as I am doing would be not offending
any moral norm if he still felt resentful. There was, after all, no apology. But given
how I am approaching the situation, the question of warrant simply drops out as
irrelevant. Notice that my willingness to forgive in such cases in no way exhibits any
sort of lack of self-respect; nor is it condoning untoward behavior. It’s
uncontroversial that what you did was offensive. Griswold’s analysis seems
insensitive to the ethical realities in such cases.
Something I felt to be particularly jarring about what I’m calling Griswold’s
moralizing of the situation is Griswold’s (and others) bringing to bear legal
terminology on the ethical life. The question is whether concepts like justification,
warrant, obligation and moral duty are the pivotal ones in potential forgiveness
situations. A really striking example was Griswold’s idea that the moral community
cedes to the offended party the moral standing to be the sole purveyor of forgiveness.5
That, and the role of justification and warrant throughout Griswold’s discussion.
Bernard Williams and others have objected to what they call scientism, the (mis)
application to various domains of philosophy of modes of thought and explanation
that derive from the sciences. Parallel to such scientism is legalism, the imposition of
legal categories on the ethical domain. The matter is of course quite controversial.6
Secular and Religious Approaches to Forgiveness
When the APA approached me to comment on Griswold’s book, Charles expressed
interest in my articulating a religious perspective that might contrast with his secular
perspective. The topic of secular and religious perspectives on forgiveness, and on
ethical matters more generally, is of great interest to me. While I am skeptical of
religion’s ability to provide a logical or philosophical foundation for ethics, I do
think that a religious outlook provides important perspective on the ethical life,
forgiveness an important case in point. The topic deserves much more discussion,
but here is a sketch from my own religious orientation.
5 P. 52. On page 48, Griswold writes that “the victim alone owns the moral right to forgiveness.” On pp.
118–119, Griswold discusses standing in connection with “third-party forgiveness.” For politically
inspired vocabulary in addition to the legel, see Pamela Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising
Forgiveness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXII, No. 3, May 2001, who sees the
resentment and anger as expressive of moral protest.
6 See my paper, “The Significance of Religious Experience,” (forthcoming, The New Scholasticism; also
available on my website: http://www.philosophy.ucr.edu/people/faculty/wettstein/index.html)
I note there the same legalizing tendency in epistemology, specifically in philosophical theorizing about
the justification of religious belief. The key notions are again warrant, justification, and obligation. In both
domains, ethics and epistemology, the matter is controversial and to many the legalistic turn will seem
perfectly natural. In the epistemic realm, my own view is that we would do better to worry about whether
we are being epistemically responsible than whether we are justified, the latter connected with granting too
much respect to the skeptic, or so I argue in that paper.
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It is characteristic of the Jewish religious sensibility (first emphasized in the
prophetic literature) to see God and the people as bound in a quasi-marital
relationship. Our love for God, and God’s love for us, are thus modeled on human
love relationships, more than they are in say in various strains of Christianity (and to
some extent also in various strains of Jewish and other traditions), where a person’s
love for God is something like the worship or adoration of perfection, and God’s
love for persons is a matter of undeserved grace.
Given the intimacy, intensity, and domesticity of the relationship between God and
the people, it is not surprising that frictions are engendered. We often fail to live up to
our responsibilities to God, sometimes in how we treat Him per se, often in our
relationships with one another.7 On his side, God is angry and vengeful, silent, absent.
It is characteristic of the Hebrew Bible and Jewish religious sensibility to be blunt
about the mutual failures. God tells the prophet Hosea to marry a prostitute; perhaps
to convey to him a sense of what it feels like to God to be intimately associated with
Israel. At the same time that book powerfully expresses God’s commitment to the
people; even his longing for them. On the other side, there is a folk story about a
group of inmates at Auschwitz who put God on trial for crimes against humanity,
find Him guilty, and then proceed to their afternoon prayers.8 And just as God longs
for His people, we think of him as flawless, for example, (sometimes) in Psalms.
Real love relationships are like that. At one moment one is intoxicated with one’s
lover and her virtues; at other times, one can feel estranged, alienated and the like.9
Forgiving one another and the virtue of forgivingness, it should go without saying,
must play an enormous role in such relationships. I’ll focus here on God’s
forgivingness, for the Bible one of God’s cardinal virtues. God is said to be long-
suffering (absorbs many stings), quick to (stands ready to) forgive, does not let his anger
consume (it consumes neither Him nor us).10 We are told to be like Him in these ways,
and further (like Him) not always to hold one’s tongue but in the right context to
rebuke one another for wrongdoing. This among the commandments is one of the
most difficult to get right since it amounts to pointing out the foibles and wrongdoings
of another with love and sensitivity, and without condescension. None of this implies
that anger is never appropriate; for one sufficiently ethically developed, some sorts and
degrees of anger are compatible with love, sensitivity, and a lack of condescension.11
7 When one fails to treat another appropriately, an evil in itself, one at the same time violates trust with
God.
8 Even if it’s only a folk story, it’s existence tells us something about the cultural/religious outlook of the
folk. See Elie Wiesel, The Trial of God, Schocken Books, 1995.
9 In the 1948 Academy Award winning film, The Best Years of Our Lives, a wife of many years says to her
daughter about her husband and their to-all-appearances very successful and happy marriage, “If you only
knew how many times we had to fall in love again.” Such is the fate of God and Israel.
10 These remarks prompt questions about how God’s fierce anger in the Bible comports with his being
long-suffering and with his anger not consuming. Also pressing is the problem of injustice in the world,
the problem of evil. For my approach to the latter see my paper, “Against Theodicy,” in Proceedings of
The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, available on my website.
11 So I sum up my sense of the matter. But there is a truly extensive rabbinic literature on anger, much of it
concerned with the perils of anger. Unlike the philosophic literature I’ve been discussing that sees moral
anger as appropriate, justified, as the correct reaction to injury for a person morally and personally well-
situated, the emphasis of the rabbinic literature is on the ideal exemplified by God’s forgivingness. Perhaps
there is the suggestion here that what forgiveness overcomes is not always anger; offense creates rupture
and forgiveness reestablishes harmony.
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My interest in a religious perspective and specifically the biblical perspective just
sketched is not because I think that religion makes possible some special and
perhaps superior kind of forgiveness, one that is unavailable to a purely secular
outlook. Rather it sheds light on what we humans are up to in forgiving one another.
One point of special interest is the Bible’s domesticating of forgiveness, the quasi-
marital relationship mentioned. Focusing our thinking about forgiveness on
situations of intimacy seems salutary for as noted proximity engenders friction
and forgivingness becomes an important virtue. I turn now to a rough and ready
account of the virtue, one that is inspired in part by the discussion of the biblical
perspective.
The Virtue of Forgivingness
As a preamble, I want to mention a remark of my colleague Larry Wright, a remark
that I alluded to above. Wright suggested that we human beings would do well to
forego some of our anger in favor of an increased sense of irony, a kind of cosmic
irony. I took this to be a remark in the spirit of Spinoza; one with a refined sense of
human limitation and some ability to see things “under the aspect of eternity” may
be less surprised and less angry at the human foibles that come in one’s direction.
This is no matter or making excuses or condoning injurious behavior. One remains
committed to being a certain sort of person, to teaching this to one’s children, etc.
One who has internalized something of this perspective seems to me on the road to
becoming a more forgiving person.
My sketch:
& A forgiving person is likely to absorb more stings than an unforgiving person,
and not because of a lack of self-respect or anything of the sort.
& She is also more apt to forget such stings as have occurred, at least the minor
ones, and even not so minor ones, again not at the cost of self-respect, etc.
Forgetting, in the right context, to the right extent, comes to seem like an
important aspect of the virtue.
& Crucially, she also knows the limits, at what point it’s important not to hold one’s
tongue, to protest wrong, and the like. This is of course related to self-respect.
& In contexts where apology is owed her, she is unlikely to require a full narrative
of the sort discussed by Griswold (major moral breaches aside of course).
& Her interest in not humiliating the other similarly makes it entirely natural that
she not be much interested in any repudiation of the self that did the damage
(again major breaches aside).
& In contexts where apology is owed her and done in the right spirit and to the
roughly right degree of detail, she finds herself spontaneously less angry. She
does not forego her anger (since it’s no longer warranted), as one foregoes things
one might still desire.
& She is not apt to reduce the other to less that he is, to one who is “just an
offender” even while the offense still hangs in the air.
My characterization of the virtue of forgivingness makes strong contact with a
number of my earlier hesitations about Griswold’s analysis of the act or process of
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forgiveness. At the level of detail, many of Griswold’s central foci just do not figure
in the virtue I’ve been describing, for example, Griswold’s emphasis on the duty-
motivated foregoing of resentment.12 But perhaps more important—this at the level
of the picture of the domain—the moral reckoning so central to Griswold’s account
violates the spirit of what I’m suggesting. We need to shift attention, or so my sketch
suggests, from questions of justification and the agent’s sense of his duties to
affective matters like love, generosity of spirit, and the desire to bridge the gulf that
hurt creates.13
To thus comment on the need to shift direction is not yet to articulate an
alternative picture of forgiveness, something I cannot yet do to my satisfaction. What
exactly is it to forgive? Is forgiveness a single thing—an act or process—subject to
some sort of analysis? Are terms like “act” and “process” adequate? Of course, there
are examples where forgiveness seems to consist in an act; I ask for forgiveness; you
respond that I am forgiven, and the issue never arises again for either of us.
Sometimes “process” seems just right; one works for some time on forgiving a dead
parent and at some point the process seems to have taken hold. But there are
examples that seem to involve nothing of these sorts; my friend asks for forgiveness
for something that took place a while back, and I respond that I forgave him for that
a long time ago, this despite the fact that I never explicitly, in some mental act or
verbal remark, did so. What transpired was the gradual passing of bad feeling. In
many such cases forgiveness seems bestowed en passant.
Perhaps what we have is a non-uniform array of cases—examples of
forgiveness—that resemble each other in complicated ways. Sometimes, the
offended party’s anger is understandable and something to be overcome.
Sometimes, anger is hardly present or not present at all; nevertheless, the offense
created a rupture. Sometimes the forgiveness is a more or less datable act or event.
Sometimes it’s more like a lingering process, one that is only more or less
complete. Sometimes the offender is forgiven but not by way of some intentional
act. Sometimes forgiveness requires elaborate apology, sometimes with a detailed
accounting of how such a thing could happen; sometimes not at all…. Perhaps we
have here what James and Dewey suppose about religion, and what for
Wittgenstein became a central analytical tool, the idea of a rough assemblage
that for good reason have come to be thought of, and so in an important sense
have come to be, a single phenomenon.
Let me conclude by saying again how much I appreciated and learned from
Griswold’s book. Philosophical differences aside, I particularly appreciated many of
12 I have been describing a virtue of character in a rough and ready way. Needless to say there will be all
sorts of variations in actual cases. A person who is virtuous in the respect in question may, if very sensitive
on a certain topic, have to forego her desire to hurt back. She may have to work at letting go of her anger
because it’s no longer fair, etc. These are of course some of the features that are emphasized by Griswold.
But where he makes them internal to the nature of forgiveness, I see them as reflecting special
circumstances, human foibles, and the like.
13 I am grateful here to (my recollection of) a comment of Tom Olshewsky at the APA symposium which
expanded my focus to include generosity of spirit. His point was that forgiveness might be related
(perhaps even etymologically) to givingness. Jeff Helmreich, in a related comment, emphasized what I
think is a Levinasian perspective according to which forgiveness paradigmatically derives from a
departure from the stance of the moral judge and the taking up of a very different stance, one that reflects
empathy and love.
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its insights and emphases, for example, Griswold’s distinguishing between, and his
sustained attention to, the relevant virtue of character and something else that is
difficult to be clear about, something that we bestow on one another. Moreover, the
granting of forgiveness, as Griswold explains, is no simple bestowal; it involves
ethical commitments that are extended over time.14
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
14 This paper derives from my Pacific APA comments in Pasadena, March 2008 in a symposium on
Griswold’s Forgiveness. I am grateful to Charles Griswold for discussions of these matters, and to Michael
Goerger and especially to Jeff Helmreich for helpful discussions both of the Griswold book and of what
went into this paper.
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